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The promise of genetic science, particularly human genetic engi-
neering, appeals to that in humans which strives for perfection -
perfection in oneself, one's life, one's children. Genetic manipulation
offers the dream of controlling disease,1 extending life,2 and provid-
ing one's offspring with super-human strength, intelligence, and
beauty.3 There is, however, an unsettling discomfort that manipulat-
ing life is indulging in a hubris that will eventually destroy human-
ity. By creating wholly unknown life forms, it is feared scientists
may inadvertently unleash plagues of incurable disease. A new dis-
crimination may emerge where genetically superior humans have
greater entitlements than those whose genes are inferior.4 History
provides horrific examples of despots who would abuse the eugenic5
power of genetic engineering to create a master race. Some see a fu-
ture of loathsome monsters, constructed from the genetic material of
variant species, mixing plants, animals, microbes, and even humans.
Should such fears prove unfounded, there is a lingering uneasiness
that tampering with the essence of life is somehow unholy, that there
is an inherent evil in made-to-order life.
This Article examines the bioethical, moral and legal implications
of using genetic sciences, including human genetic engineering, in a
new, already emerging eugenics. Section II describes genetic engi-
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE 42 (1982) [hereinafter
SPLICING LIFE].
2. See Begley, Outsmart Your Genes, Be Young Forever, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 7, 1991,
at 49.
3. Rosenkranz, Custom Kids and the Moral Duty to Genetically Engineer Our
Children, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (1987).
4. See infra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
5. For a definition of eugenics, see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
neering, its basic processes, and its potential eugenic uses. That sec-
tion defines eugenics, examines its history, and the history of genetic
engineering, describing current uses of genetics in genetic screening
and gene therapy. Section III discusses the problem of access to ge-
netic services, explores the problem of distributing its benefits and
considers the difficulty of maintaining the confidentiality of an indi-
vidual's genetic profile. That section examines the moral and reli-
gious arguments for and against using genetic engineering. Section
III also looks at the legal arguments affecting both continued re-
search and individual rights in using genetic science. Finally, section
IV addresses the controversial present day eugenic effects of fetal
abortions. Although the abortion issue often arises in the genetics
debate, genetic engineering and eugenics will ultimately swallow the
abortion issue. With every step toward perfecting the control of ge-
netics and procreation, abortion becomes a mere relic - a crude, Dra-
conian attempt from a bygone age to affect propagation. Eugenic
uses of genetic engineering go beyond the termination of human life,
to the potential alteration of what it means to be human. While
these changes may hold great benefit, there is also the potential for
great destruction. In the eugenics debate is a classic slippery slope




1. What is Genetic Engineering?
Genetic engineering6 is the chemical manipulation of the genetic
information contained in plant, animal and human cells, 7 causing bio-
logical alterations in both individual cells and organic structures.8
Genetic information is stored in the nucleus of every living cell.9
Genes containing this information are arranged along fibrous struc-
tures called chromosomes, composed mainly of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) and protein.10 Humans have twenty-three pairs of chromo-
6. The term "genetic engineering" was coined in 1965 by Rollin Hotchkiss. J.
AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 2 (1984).
7. Genetic engineering is possible in all life forms. This Article addresses only
human genetic engineering.
8. See G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 1 (1981). "The essence of engi-
neering is design and, thus, the essence of genetic engineering... is the introduction of
human design into formulation of new genes and new genetic combinations." Sin-
sheimer, Troubled Dawn for Genetic Engineering, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS 607, 607 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978) [hereinafter CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES].
9. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 478 (C.
Clayman ed. 1989) [hereinafter AMA ENCYCLOPEDIA].
10. Id. at 279. DNA is the substance that encodes and transmits the genetic char-
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somes, one of each pair having been contributed ly each of an indi-
vidual's parents.'1
Genetic structure influences virtually every aspect -of human devel-
opment including body weight, height, eye color, intelligence, disease
resistance, longevity, and perhaps even person4lity.12t By altering a
cell's genetic code, it is possible to change not only the basic charac-
teristics of that cell, but also the organism itself.1', Iepending on the
type of cell modified, it is possible to alter all of the individual's off-
spring as well.14
2. Genetic Engineering Methods
Genetic engineering refers to specific "techniqu es by which scien-
tists can add genetically determined characteristics to cells that
would not otherwise possess them."15 Genetic en, gineering occurs in
two forms, depending on the kind of cells altered. When somatic
cells are changed, those which compose an individual's.tissues and or-
gans, genetic change results only in that individual.16 Such changes
are not inheritable.17 Applied to germ cells, sperm or ovum (egg),
changes affect not only the individual but also l4is'or her offspring.'8
Thus, the alteration of germ cells holds the greatest eugenic
possibilities.
a. In Vitro Fertilization
In vitro1 9 fertilization (IVF) allows manipulation of the egg and
acteristics of a parent to his child. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 377 (W. Don-
nette ed. 1982). It is a long, twisted molecule consisting of subunits, the arrangement
of which determines the genetic characteristics of the organism containing the mole-
cule. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 440 (C. Thomas ed. 1981).
11. AMA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, at 279.
12. Id. at 478-80.
13. Id. at 484.
14. Id.
15. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 8.
16. Patterson, The Great Genetics Debate, INDUSTRY WEEK, Dec. 10, 1984, at 42.
Genetic engineering of germ cells is called gametic genetic epgineering. BIOLAW 105-
06 (1989). The sperm and the egg are called gametes. 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 1172 (S. Landau ed. 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY].
17. BIOLAW, supra note 16, at 105-06.
18. Id.
19. From the Latin, meaning "in glass." INTERNATIONAI DICTIONARY, supra note
16, at 1466.
young embryo outside the womb.20 It may be useful when a woman's
fallopian tubes are blocked or when a man's sperm count is insuffi-
cient to achieve fertilization without laboratory assistance.21 In such
circumstances, one or more eggs22 are surgically withdrawn from a
woman's ovary and fertilized with male sperm.23 The resulting zy-
gotes24 are implanted into the uterus of the woman who is to bring
the baby to term.25 Once the zygote begins to divide, the organism is
known as an embryo.26 After the embryo has grown in the uterine
wall for about six weeks, the embryo becomes a fetus.27 IVF is not
itself genetic engineering but it is a process used in many genetic
technologies. 28 When the zygote or embryo is outside the mother,
radical forms of genetic engineering, such as cloning29 or gene-splic-
ing,30 may be performed.
b. C7oning
Cloning is a technology which makes possible production of off-
spring in the exact genetic likeness of the parent organism.31 The
20. See Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157, 159 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1983). This is a ga-
metic process.
21. See Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Struc-
ture of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 947 (1986) [hereinafter Robert-
son, New Reproduction].
22. Neuhaus, The Return of Eugenics, in GUARANTEEING THE GOOD LIFE:
MEDICINE AND THE RETURN OF EUGENICS 3 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1990).
23. In 1985, over 20,000 children were conceived by artificial insemination. Note,
Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preimplantation
Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1985). This process may be per-
formed either in vitro or, more commonly, without removing the egg from the mother.
Id. at 1022-23.
24. A zygote is the single cell which contains the genetic information from both
the male and female but has not yet begun the process of division to form new cells.
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 3200.
25. It is not necessary to implant the fertilized egg in the woman who provided the
ovum. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (fertilized egg implanted in surro-
gate who later sought custody of child). One may observe that it is possible, using in
vitro fertilization (IVF), for a child to have as many as six parents: the two who con-
tract for the baby's conception, the woman who provides the egg, the man who pro-
vides the sperm, the woman in whose womb the zygote or embryo is implanted and
that woman's husband.
26. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 923.
27. Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene
Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 534 n.71 (1983).
28. Note, Designer Genes: An Ethical Perspective on Genetic Manipulation, 15
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 447, 449 (1989).
29. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
31. Hudock, Gene Therapy and Genetic Engineering: Frankenstein Is Still a Myth,
But It Should Be Reread Periodically, 48 IND. L.J. 533, 549-50 (1973). This is a gametic
process. Animals as genetically complex as calves have been cloned. B. ZIMMERMAN,
BIOFUTURE: CONFRONTING THE GENETIC ERA 271 (1984). As applied to eugenics, clon-
ing would allow the copying of humans who have superior genetic traits. Attanasio,
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nucleus of the cell to be replicated is microsurgically substituted for
the nucleus of an egg cell.32 The modified cell then multiplies and
grows to produce an exact copy of the original organism from which
the nucleus of the cell was taken.33 Through cloning, it is possible to
reproduce an organism asexually with both halves of the chromo-
some pairs coming from the same individual rather than from two
parents.34 Cloning provides the eugenic opportunity to create any
number of individuals with the exact same genetically-based
characteristics.
c. Recombinant DNA
Perhaps the most radical form of genetic engineering is recombi-
nant DNA (rDNA), or gene-splicing. Through rDNA, scientists can
isolate a specific DNA sequence from one individual and splice it to
the DNA sequence of another individual.35 Even the genetic material
from different species may be combined.36 Scientists have, for exam-
The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative
Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1282 (1986).
32. Hudock, supra note 31, at 549-50.
33. R. McKINNELL, CLONING: A BIOLOGIST REPORTS 10-11 (1979). The steps re-
quired to clone a human would be, first, to remove the nucleus of the donor's egg cell.
Id. at 82-85. If the subject to be cloned is female, she might even provide her own do-
nor cell. Id. at 80. Next, a nucleus from any of the cells of the person to be cloned
would replace the destroyed nucleus of the donor cell. Id. at 85-92. The microsurgical
techniques to perform this portion of the process are, as yet, undeveloped. Id. at 87-90.
Third, the new cell is placed in vitro in a nutrient medium where it would begin to
divide. Id. at 92. Four to six days after initial cell division, it would be implanted in
the uterus of a woman who would carry the baby to term. Id. at 93. The cloned indi-
vidual would be the identical twin of the person who contributed the body cell.
Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, 100 AM. NATURALIST 549,
562 (1966). With banks of tissue cultures, it would even be possible to clone a deceased
person using this process. See B. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 31, at 47.
34. Rivers, Genetic Engineering Portends a Brave New World, in HUMAN GENET-
ICS 3, 10 (T. Mertens ed. 1975).
35. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 9. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying
text for a description of genes, chromosomes, and the function of DNA. Unlike clon-
ing, this process alters the genetic code of the individual. Recombinant DNA technolo-
gies splice the chain of genes which are arranged in the chromosomes. Id. By
rearranging the chain or substituting new genetic material, the genetic composition of
the cell is altered. Id.
A process similar to rDNA is cell fusion wherein the genetic material from two dif-
ferent cells are combined to produce a hybrid. Id. This new cell exists, develops and
reproduces in its own right. Id.
36. BIOLAW, supra note 16, at 104. In 1972, scientists first split DNA and then
recombined it. Jackson, Principles and Applications of Recombinent DNA Methodol-
ogy, in THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE 39, 39 (D. Jackson & S. Stich eds. 1979). The
possibility of combining traits from different species, even between plants and animals,
significantly troubles the opponents of genetic engineering. Id. at 105.
ple, created a strain of "supermice" by injecting synthesized human
growth hormone genes into mouse embryos.37 Experiments in which
copies of a human gene are transplanted into monkeys are part of an
effort to treat adenosine deaminase, a rare genetic disorder affecting
the human immune system.3 8 Through rDNA, scientists may liter-
ally manipulate the building blocks of life. The cross-species combi-
nations that are possible are limited only by the scientist's
imagination.3 9 Through the use of gene-splicing it would be possible
to alter the nature of human life.40
3. The Importance of Genetic Engineering
The potential significance of human genetic engineering is difficult
to overstate, especially as applied to eugenics. The development of
genetic engineering has been called "a watershed in history, perhaps
even in evolution."41 It is believed human genetic experimentation
will provide scientists with the ability to predict both an individual's
expected performance as well as the performance of future genera-
tions.42 Because of both the positive and negative potential of genetic
engineering, there is considerable controversy whether such experi-
mentation should even be permitted.43 These experiments, for exam-
ple, may alter the human "gene pool," the universe of existing
human genes.44 The present gene pool provides the variety of human
characteristics that allow humans to adapt to changing environ-
ments.45 Altering the gene pool would almost certainly affect the fu-
37. M. Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
315, 327 (1985). Similar attempts have been made with sheep and pigs. 50 Fed. Reg.
9760 (1985). A gene which controls growth in rainbow trout has been introduced into
the genetic structure of a common carp creating a much faster growing carp. N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1988, at A20, col. 1.
38. Gene Therapy for Humans Moves Nearer to Reality, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987,
at C1, col. 1 [hereinafter Gene Therapy]. These experiments were conducted at the
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York. Id. University of California at
San Diego researchers have successfully transplanted human genes into rabbits in ex-
periments directed at regulating cholesterol, an important factor in controlling heart
disease. Gene Studies Emerging as Key Engine of Science, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1988, at
C1, col. 1.
39. See Novick, The Dangers of Unrestricted Research: The Case of Recombinant
DNA, in RECOMBINANT DNA, SCIENCE ETHICS, AND POLITICS 71, 85-91 (J. Richards ed.
1978).
40. Rivers, supra note 34, at 10.
41. Whether to Make Perfect Humans, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1982, at A22, col. 1.
"Human beings [could] have the chance to 'rise above [their] nature' for 'the first time
in all time'.... ." SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 68-69.
42. Elsas, A Clinical Approach to Legal and Ethical Problems in Human Genetics,
39 EMORY L.J. 811, 815 (1990).
43. See infra notes 232-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of regulatory
attempts to restrict and limit genetic engineering.
44. Ziegler, Battle of the Potato Field Highlights Future of Genetic Engineering,
Aug. 13, 1984 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file).
45. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 23.
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ture of humanity.46
Even if such genetic experimentation continues, there is considera-
ble disagreement as to how soon the power to directly affect human
genetic structure will be available. There are those who believe the
possibilities of gene therapy 47 are near term.48 Although many tech-
nical hurdles have been cleared in identifying and treating single-
gene defects, other problems still remain.49 It will be even longer
before complex polygenetic human traits can be engineered.5 0
B. Eugenics
1. What is Eugenics?
Eugenics has been described as a social movement to improve the
human species through the use of technology. 51 The eugenic poten-
46. See Hilts, Clergyman Ask Ban on Ffforts to Alter Genes, Wash. Post, June 8,
1983, at Al.
47. Genetic engineering for purposes of gene therapy has two distinguishable goals
depending on whether the cells affected are somatic or gametic. The goal of somatic
gene therapy is to rectify a genetic defect in an individual. See infra notes 92-96 and
accompanying text. See also Orkin & Williams, Gene Therapy of Somatic Cells: Status
and Prospects, in MOLECULAR GENETICS IN MEDICINE 130, 130 (B. Childs, N. Holtzman,
H. Kazazian, D. Valle eds. 1988). On the other hand, gametic genetic engineering is
designed to alter genes both in the individual and the individual's offspring. Id at 131.
It is this latter use which may be eugenic. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Gore & Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 336, 354 (1985) (noting that "the technology to perform gene therapy may be
upon us sooner than originally imagined"); B. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 31, at 192 (stat-
ing that direct manipulation of complex, polygenic traits such as intelligence "probably
won't be as much as 50 years and could be as short as 10").
49. Childs & Motulsky, Recombinant DNA Analysis of Multifactoral Disease, in
MOLECULAR GENETICS IN MEDICINE 180, 180 (B. Childs, N. Holtzman, H. Kazazian & D.
Valle, eds. 1988). See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
50. Robertson, Genetic Alteration of Embryos: The Ethical Issues, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW III 115-17 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1985) [hereinafter Robertson,
Genetic Alteration]. "[I]t is a mistake to think that human applications of genetic engi-
neering to root out even single-gene defects, much less for incredibly more complex
multifactorial and polygenic traits, is just around the corner." Id at 116. See also
SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 48 (stating that "[t]he technical uncertainties, the ethi-
cal implications, and the low probability of actually treating an affected person are
strong contraindications against therapy of fertilized eggs or embryos becoming a use-
ful clinical option in the near future."); D. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENET-
ICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 296 (1985) (asserting that "There is widespread
agreement among geneticists that, with a few exceptions, gene therapy is distant for
single-gene disorders and beyond sight for the polygenic variety."). Kevles warns that
predictions of early success result from both biomedical advocates intent on justifying
large government research grants and press reports based on insufficient examination.
Id. at 296.
51. Neuhaus, supra note 22, at 1. The originator of the term "eugenics" defined it
as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair ... future
tial of genetic engineering is considerable. There are a number of
other genetic processes, however, that arguably have eugenic effects.
These include genetic screening52 and even the general practice of
medicine.53
Eugenics may be classified as either negative or positive. Negative
eugenics seeks to reduce or eliminate deleterious genes, while posi-
tive eugenics encourages'desirable or superior traits.54 Except for se-
lective breeding through genetic screening, positive eugenics is still
beyond the limits of current technology.55 ' In contrast, negative
eugenics already holds some footholds in current culture which cause
little controversy. For example, states engage in negative eugenics
through laws prohibiting incest and requiring couples to be tested for
disease and other disorders prior to marriage.56 Amniocentesis and
other technologies allow doctors to examine the genetic makeup of
the fetus well before birth.57 Parental knowledge of the fetus' sex or
generations either physically or mentally." Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit - Is Steril-
ization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 591 (1966) (quoting Sir Francis Galton,
grandfather of the eugenics movement at the turn of the century). For a discussion of
the history* of the genetics movement, see infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
52. Genetic screening based on the presence of desired genetic traits may be part
of a sperm bank's selective breeding process. See G. SMITH, supra note 8, at 104. See
also infra, note 55 and accompanying text. Selective breeding, which operates by dis-
couraging the procreation of couples who are likely to bear children with a significant
genetic defect, is also common. For a discussion of recent developments concerning ge-
netic screening therapy, see infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of the role of the practice of medicine in eugenics, see infra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
54. van Loon, A Buddhist Perspective, in GENETICS AND SOCIETY 148, 154-55 (G.
Oosthuizen, H. Shapiro & S. Strauss eds. 1980). This eugenic distinction parallels the
distinction between genetic therapy, which seeks to alter or eliminate genes which
cause negative characteristics, and genetic engineering, which seeks to promote posi-
tive traits. Note, supra note 28, at 452.
55. Such selective breeding includes the use of sperm banks which have been es-
tablished to maintain the semen of "distinguished" persons beyond their lifetimes.
Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 147 (1968). In 1979, the Repository for Germinal Choice became operational
in Escondido, California. It is designed to make available the sperm of Nobel Prize
winners and other "creative, intelligent people." Owner of "Genius" Sperm Bank
Pleased by Results, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1984, at A17, col. 1. See also Playboy Inter-
view: William Shockley, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1980, at 69.
56. Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional As-
sessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 534-35 (1974). State stat-
utes require premarital testing for maternal rubella, blood group, and Rh status. Id. at
535. For example, the State of New York provides for premarital testing to identify
carriers of the sickle cell gene. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 13-aa (McKinney 1988).
The United States Supreme Court approved compulsory sterilization for imbecility
in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927). In approving another form of negative
eugenics, the Court stated, "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to exe-
cute degenerated offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. at 207.
See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
57. Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Lib-
erty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281, 284-85 (1981). Chorion villi sam-
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genetic defects may result in abortion for purposes that could easily
be described as eugenic.58 Although these practices are not usually
recognized as eugenic, their modern day use and prevalence portends
the eventual acceptance of genetic engineering for eugenic purposes.
2. The Practice of Medicine as Eugenics
Some areas of medicine that are not usually recognized as eugenic
affect the human gene pool. These include sterilization and surgical
techniques that allow reproductive organs to function. However,
even medicine that does not directly involve reproductive organs may
alter the gene pool.5 9 This is most evident in the treatment of dis-
ease, particularly genetically-based diseases, which normally result in
death before the patient reaches reproductive age. Medicine often
makes it possible for persons to reproduce who in an earlier era, be-
cause they would have died at an earlier age, would not have repro-
duced.60 Genetic abnormalities in such persons are thus duplicated,
altering the gene pool. 61 There is considerable disagreement as to
how seriously the general practice of medicine affects the gene
pool.62 However, regardless of public concern over eugenic effects,
the fact remains that medical treatment of such disorders impacts the
pling reveals genetic makeup at eight to ten weeks, some six weeks earlier than
amniocentesis. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J.
697, 709 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
58. See Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48
IND. L.J. 559, 560 (1973). Abortion for gender selection has received opposition. Wertz
& Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, 19 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. May-June 1989, at 21. Such abortions are illegal in Pennsylvania. Act
1989-64, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 3204(c) (Purdon). A poll conducted in the early 1980s
found that 75% of people surveyed approved abortion of an abnormal fetus. Henshaw
& Martire, Abortion and the Public Opinion Polls, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 53, 59 (1982)
(noting that 16% of the women polled felt it was morally wrong to have an abortion
when the fetus has a severe genetic defect, while nine percent were unsure).
59. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 8.
60. Id (corrective treatments that prolong life expectancies include insulin injec-
tion for diabetics and prescriptive lenses for myopia patients).
61. Id
62. Compare J. FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 182 (1974) ("We are
now approaching a situation in which genetic causes account for as many or more
deaths than 'disease' in the popular sense." (emphasis in original)) and Francoeur, We
Can - We Must: Reflections on the Technological Imperative, 33 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
428, 437 (Theological Studies, Inc., No. 3, 1972) (asserting that "Today's medicine has
opened the door to a pollution of a human gene pool which may well be a death war-
rant for mankind.") with Lappe, Moral Obligations and the Fallacies of "Genetic Con-
trol," 33 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 411, 419 (Theological Studies, Inc., No. 3, 1972) (stating
that "Imminent 'genetic deterioration' of the species is for all intents and purposes, a
red herring.").
gene pool by "increas[ing] the prevalence in the population of certain
genes that have deleterious effects." 63 It is on the basis of such
widely accepted practices that more radical eugenic processes may
also find acceptance.
C. Historical Background
1. From Plato to Watson
Eugenics precedes the development of genetic science, but their
histories have become intertwined. Plato idealized selective human
breeding as the foundation for the creation of a superior Guardian
class.64 In ancient Sparta, expectant mothers gazed at statues of
Castor and Pollux to encourage the birth of healthier, more perfect
children.6 5 In 1860, Austrian monk Gregor Mendel laid the founda-
tion for genetics and more scientific selective breeding when he ob-
served that characteristics of the pea plant were transmitted from
generation to generation in a predictable manner.66 Nine years later,
Charles Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton, coined the term "eugen-
ics," asserting that the practice, when applied to humans through se-
lective breeding, would give the "more suitable races or strains of
blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable."67
Mendel's theories were rediscovered in the early twentieth century
when the ability to predict genetic characteristics was noted in both
plants and animals.68 In the early 1900s, eugenicists in the United
States were confident that improvements in human genetic structure
could be achieved through eugenics.6 9 Proponents asserted that
"mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, criminality, pauperism
and various other defects were hereditary." 70 Since there were no
known cures for hereditary defects, measures preventing propagation
63. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 8.
64. Plato, The Republic, in I THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 163, 217-21 (B. Jowett
Trans. 3d ed. impression of 1931).
65. Warkany, Congenital Malformations in the Past, 10 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 84,
88 (1959).
66. See generally F. PORTUGAL & J. COHEN, A CENTURY OF DNA: A HISTORY OF
THE DISCOVERY OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE GENETIC SUBSTANCE 112-14
(1977).
67. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 U. CAL. L.A. L. REV. 443,
464 (1968), quoted in L. DUNN & T. DOBZLANSKY, HEREDITARY, RACE AND SOCIETY 9
(1946). See also Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435,
437 [hereinafter Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy] (citing Comment, Eu-
genic Artificial Insemination, A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1852
(1981)).
68. See Morgan, The Relation of Genetics to Physiology and Medicine, in NOBEL
LECTURES IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1933-1977 3-4 (D. Baltimore ed. 1977).
69. Larson, Human Gene Therapy and the Law: An Introduction to the Literature,
39 EMORY L.J. 855, 868 (1990).
70. Ferster, supra note 51, at 592.
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by "the unfit" were advocated.7 '
Eugenicists preached social reform citing fear that lower classes
were reproducing in greater proportions than the rest of the popula-
tion.72 They urged the "well-bred" to increase their reproductive ac-
tivity73 and criticized democracy as a form of government that
enables the ignorant masses to exercise political power over the
intelligentsia. 74
Believing that immigrants to the United States were a prime
source of social decline, in 1912 the United States Public Health Ser-
vice administered IQ tests to determine the extent of "feebleminded-
ness" among entering classes of foreigners.75 According to the tests,
eighty-three percent of the Hungarians, eighty-seven percent of the
Russians, eighty-three percent of the Jews and seventy-nine percent
of the Italians demonstrated a source of feeblemindedness. 76 As a re-
sult, Congress passed the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924,77 man-
dating entry quotas based upon the immigrant's nationality and the
proportion of that nation's people living in the United States as of
1890.78 Critics staunchly argued that the Act was racist and eugeni-
cally motivated.79
About that time, a more active eugenics program was developing in
many states. By 1931, thirty-two states had passed eugenic laws au-
thorizing the involuntary sterilization of certain groups.S0 The high
water mark for eugenics came in 1927 when the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia compulsory
sterilization statute in the landmark case of Buck v. Bell.8 1 In the
majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned the state-
71. Id.
72. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COL. L.
REV. 1418, 1422-25 (1981).
73. Id. at 1422-27.
74. Id. at 1427.
75. Beckwith, Social and Political Uses of Genetics in the United States: Past and
Present, in ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES POSED BY HUMAN USES OF MOLECULAR GE-
NETICS, 265 N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 46, 48 (M. Lappe and R. Morison eds. 1976).
76. Id.
77. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). See Beckwith, supra note 75, at 49 (stating that
"[p]robably the greatest impact of the eugenics movement on the nature of our society
was the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924").
78. Beckwith, supra note 75, at 49.
79. Id. ("The testimony and support for this law was explicitly racist.").
80. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, supra note 67, at 438-39.
81. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). For an enlightening examination of this
case, see Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
ment that came to epitomize the eugenics movement: "Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough."8 2
Despite the Court's monumental decision supporting pro-
eugenicists, the popularity of the eugenics movement began to de-
cline.83 State laws mandating involuntary sterilization were over-
turned.8 4 Research in psychology, sociology, and anthropology in the
1930s began to show that not only hereditary, but also environmental
influences, were important in determining human characteristics.8 5
Crowning the eugenic decline and discrediting the movement as a
whole were the atrocities of the Third Reich.8 6 Experiments at-
tempting to fashion a master race and the devastation of the Holo-
caust are the most often cited examples of the potential misuse of
eugenics. 87
Despite the horrors of Nazi Germany, however, the scientific basis
of what might be called a new eugenics began in 1953, when Watson
and Crick postulated the double helix of DNA as the chemical basis
82. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
83. Cynkar, supra note 72, at 1454 (noting that "Though the number of sterilza-
tions in Virginia dramatically increased following Buck v. Bell, the frequency of steril-
izations in other states generally followed their pre-1927 pattern (of decline]."). These
sterilization laws were found to be unconstitutional on equal protection, due process,
or cruel and unusual punishment grounds. Id. at 1434.
Today nearly half the states have some form of sterilization legislation on the books.
The present eugenic sterilization statutes include: CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1988);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-16 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to 3910 (1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34B §§ 7001-17 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972
& Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-501 to -505 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to
-50 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205 -.335 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8705-16
(1987); VA. CODE §§ 54.1-2974 to -2980 (1950 & Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to -5
(1986). Courts typically have upheld the validity of these statutes. See, e.g., Cook v.
Oregon, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972) (equal protection challenge
based on indigency rejected); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 178 (1968)
(compulsory sterilization as a prerequisite to a parolee's release from state home held
to be valid exercise of police power), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 996 (1970). See also Com-
ment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L.
280-302 (1975) (increases in social problems may cause increased usage of eugenic ster-
ilization laws).
84. Sterilization laws in seven states were found unconstitutional. See Williams v.
Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 527-28, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (1921) (Indiana statute held to violate due pro-
cess); State Board of Eugenics v. Clinic, No. 15, 442 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Oregon,
Dec. 13, 1921) (Oregon statute held to violate due process); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F.
687 (D. Nov. 1918) (Nevada statute held to be cruel and unusual punishment); Haynes
v. Lapur Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918) (Michigan statute held to
violate equal protection); Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (1918) (New
York statute held to violate equal protection); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa
1914) (Iowa statute held to violate due process, impose cruel and unusual punishment
and an improper bill of attainder); rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); Smith v.
Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 54, 88 A. 963, 967 (1913) (New
Jersey statute held to violate guarantees of equal protection).
85. See K. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 139-44 (1972).
86. D. KEVLES, supra note 50, at 116-18.
87. See K. LUDMERER, supra note 85, at 127-28.
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of heredity.8 8 In 1961, scientists broke DNA's genetic code89 laying
the groundwork for its manipulation of the code and the potential
construction of new life forms.90 Finally, some thirty years after the
discovery of the structure of DNA, experimenters began performing
the first clinical trials with noninheritable, somatic-cell therapy on
humans.9 1
D. Recent Developments
1. Genetic Screening and Therapy
It is now possible to diagnose a number of genetically induced dis-
eases92 in even the earliest forms of life.93 Thousands of human dis-
eases have genetic components. 94 Some diseases result from a defect
in a single gene while others involve a number of genes.95 Presuma-
bly these diseases may be cured by transplanting functioning copies
of the appropriate normal gene into the patient's cells using rDNA.96
88. F.H.C. Crick, an Englishman, and James D. Watson, an American, worked to-
gether at Cambridge using X-ray diffraction methods developed by English physicist
M.H.F. Wilkins to discover the shape and structure of the DNA molecule. I. AsiMoV,
THE GENETIC CODE 129-30 (1962). See also J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968). The
DNA molecule is a long string of smaller molecules arranged into two parallel helixes
shaped like bedsprings or "spiral staircases." Id. at 130. Discovering this structure was
a critical step in making further genetic discoveries possible. See R. HUTTON, BIo-
REVOLUTION: DNA AND THE ETHICS OF MAN-MADE LIFE 22-29 (1978).
89. J. CHERFAS, MAN-MADE LIFE 23 (1983).
90. See G. NOSSAL, RESHAPING LIFE 2 (1985).
91. Robertson, Genetic Alteration, supra note 50, at 115.
92. Childs, Genetics and Preventative Medicine, in GENETIC DISEASES AND DEVEL-
OPMENTAL DISABILITY 7 (T. Sadick & S. Puelchel eds. 1979).
93. MOLECULAR GENETICS IN MEDICINE (Progress in Medical Genetics, New Series
Vol. 7 (1988)) (stating that "Since 1976 over 500 prenatal diagnosis have been accom-
plished by analysis of fetal DNA samples."). Two diseases being targeted are Lesch-
Nyham syndrome and adenosine deaminase deficiency. Their symptoms result from
the lack of genes necessary to initiate production of enzymes, a characteristic of most
diseases caused by a single-gene defect.
94. During the 1970s, it was estimated that at least 15,000,000 people living in the
United States suffer from one or more inherited disorders. Id. These disorders ac-
count for 30% of the admissions to children's hospitals and 10% of adult hospital ad-
missions. Id. A 1981 article claimed that 182 fetal conditions can be diagnosed
prenatally. Stephenson & Weaver, Prenatal Diagnosis: A Compilation of Diagnosed
Conditions, 141 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYN. 319 (1981).
95. Gene Therapy, supra note 38, at Cl, col. 1. While the average person carries
hundreds of genes that are in some way abnormal, no more than 10 are considered fa-
tal when received from both parents. Henig, Pitfalls of Genetic Screening: New Tech-
niques Raise Difficult Ethical Questions, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1991, at Z14.
96. Gene Therapy, supra note 38, at C1, col. 1. There is much experimentation in
somatic genetic engineering, but not in humans. Id.
However, an even simpler form of genetic therapy, and subtler form
of eugenics, is presently being practiced - genetic screening.
Screening for genetic abnormalities is a relatively simple process
that may be used at three distinct points in a person's life. First, a
genetic profile may reveal whether a person is likely to develop a
particular disease or condition. Second, genetic information may af-
fect an individual's marriage partner choice and whether one should
produce children with a particular mate. Finally, such information
may determine whether a pregnancy should be carried to term. De-
cisions made at each of these points have eugenic implications.
The genetic screening process consists of analyzing a blood sample
to determine if an individual has recessive traits for genetic disease.97
Some state laws require mandatory screening of newborns for hypo-
thyroidism and phenylketonuria which may cause mental retarda-
tion.98 Many states also screen for other types of inherited metabolic
disorders.99 Currently, the eugenic effects of such programs are
fairly limited. With each new discovery of genetic links to disease,
however, the likelihood increases that more eugenic programs will be
implemented.100
Presently, genetic tests can screen for only a handful of diseases,
all caused by single genes, but there is a potential to diagnose up to
some three thousand disorders.O1 In many cases, early diagnosis can
reduce the more serious effects of a disease.10 2 The eugenic effect of
such genetic screening is particularly acute when applied to early life
forms.103 For example, one future eugenic process would not even
97. Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical
Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 696-70 (1973). For a discussion of the ban on fetal tissue re-
search, see indfra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. Fetal genetic screening is cur-
rently practiced through amniocentisis. Id. at 700-01.
98. Elsas, supra note 42, at 844.
99. Id.
100. See D. KEVLES, supra note 50, at 285-86.
101. McAuliffe, Predicting Diseases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 25, 1987, at 64.
Federal legislation permits the use of public funds to establish voluntary screening and
counseling programs for the purpose of controlling genetic diseases, with preference
given to centers for sickle cell anemia and Cooley's anemia. National Sickle Cell Ane-
mia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300b-1 to -6
(1982).
102. Elsas, Newborn Screening, in PEDIATRICS 222, 223 (A. Rudolph & J. Hoffman
18th eds. 1987). Some state legislatures require genetic screening of school children.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122 para. 27-8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 76, § 15A (West 1982); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 904 (McKinney 1988).
Parents who learn that their genetic profile indicates the possibility of a child with a
genetic defect have a number of options. They may 1) decide not to have children, 2)
adopt, 3) reproduce with an egg or sperm donor, 4) conceive through IVF and then
screen the embryo (this technique has yet to be developed), 5) conceive, undergo pre-
natal diagnosis, and abort if the fetus is affected by the genetic defect, or 6) have the
child and live with the consequences. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 57, at
698-99.
103. D. KEVLES, supra note 50, at 285-86. Anti-abortionists oppose prenatal screen-
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require genetic manipulation. A doctor would remove a number of
eggs from a woman, fertilize them using IVF, and then profile the ge-
netic characteristics of each embryo.104 The eugenic effect is in the
selection of embryos for implantation. 0 5 It is thus possible to imple-
ment a very effective eugenic program with merely the knowledge of
which genes and combination of genes are involved in disease; actual
genetic engineering is not necessary. Of course, when genetic profil-
ing is used together with gametic genetic engineering, the eugenic
possibilities are virtually limitless. A very large step is currently be-
ing taken toward creating these options in the "Human Genome
Initiative."1o6
2. The Human Genome Initiative
The Human Genome Initiative is a fifteen year,107 three billion dol-
lar, congressionally funded study 0 8 directed at mapping and sequenc-
ing the fifty to one hundred thousand genes that constitute the
human genome.109 A genome is the set of chromosomes and genes
that a particular species contains. 110 James Watson, part of the team
that discovered the structure of DNA,"' is the project director. Map-
ping determines the location of the genes on the chromosomes, while
sequencing identifies a gene's constituent parts.112 With this knowl-
edge it will be possible to locate specific, disease-related genes and
ing as "search and destroy mission[s]." Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 57,
at 710.
104. Dubler, Murray, Rifkin, Salk & Lapham, Ethics in Embryo, HARPER'S MAG.,
Sept. 1987, at 37, 42.
105. An ethical and moral issue which may arise is embryo discard. Such discard is
illegal in Louisiana and Missouri. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (West Supp.
1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon 1991). Opponents of such laws argue that an
embryo is too rudimentary in form and development to warrant such protection. See
Robertson, In the Beginning. The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437,
444 (1990). An alternative to implanting is freezing the embryo for storage. See 1 BIo.
LAW § 7-2.5 (1986).
106. The Human Genome Initiative is a project to identify the component parts of
human genetic structure. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
107. COMMITTEE ON MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME OF THE NA.
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME 90 (1988).
108. Andrews, Genetics and the Law: Introduction, 39 EMORY L.J. 619, 619 (1990).
109. Fletcher & Wertz, Ethics, Law and Medical Genetics: After the Human Gen-
ome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 754 (1990).
110. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 346 (2d ed. 1959). For the chemical
composition of the human genome, see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 88 and accommpanying text.
112. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 109, at 754. About 1900 genes have already been
mapped and 600 have been sequenced. This is two to four percent of the estimated
total. Id. at 755.
the mechanisms of the diseases they cause. 1 3 This information is im-
portant in developing diagnostic and treatment technologies.114 Be-
cause the Initiative is directed at the entire human genome rather
than merely those genes that cause disease, it will also provide infor-
mation that would be vital to both positive and negative eugenics
programs.
III. THE EUGENIC IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING
Arguments as to the wisdom of continued genetic experimentation
and the possible eugenic effects of genetic engineering fall generally
into three areas: biomedical ethics, morality and religion, and the
law.115
A. Biomedical Ethics
Genetic engineering implicates the central moral principle of bi-
omedical ethics, which is beneficence." 6 This principle implies an
obligation "to confer benefits and remove harms."1 1 7 Arguments
favoring genetic experimentation emphasize the benefits of knowing
the genetic causes of disease11S Arguments against such research
cite the fact that genetic experiments inevitably involve human em-
bryosll9 and, thus, are performed without the consent of the experi-
113. Elsas, supra note 42, at 826.
114.' See Friedmann, Progress Toward Human Gene Therapy, 244 SCIENCE 1275,
1275 (American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science No. 4910, 1989) (asserting that
"modern molecular genetics is providing tools for an unprecedented new approach to
disease treatment through an attack directly on mutant genes").
115. There is a marked difference between the principles of law and ethics. This
may be useful to keep in mind when examining the desirability of continued genetic
experimentation. Fletcher and Wertz have articulated the distinction as follows:
[Liaw expresses a basic minimum standard of human behavior considered ac-
ceptable in society. On the other hand, ethics aspires to an ideal of optimum
behavior and conduct.... [WI]hat is immoral and unethical may not always be
illegal, nor should it necessarily be.... Law, despite its frequent association
with the concept of justice, does not necessarily seek, nor achieve, justice;
rather, law seeks to allocate power and claims to distribute the cost of risks
and losses (compensation for injuries). Ethics on the other hand, is con-
sciously concerned with seeking justice and bringing about social change to
enhance the search for justice.
Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 109, at 750-51. Watson has stated: "[I]f we do not think
about [the ethical issues of human genetic engineering] now, the possibility of our hav-
ing a free choice will one day suddenly be gone." Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal
Man, ATLANTIC, May 1971, at 50, 53.
116. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 135 (1979).
117. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis omitted).
118. See Ruse, The Dangers of Unrestricted Research: The Case of Recombinant
DNA, in RECOMBINANT DNA: SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS 103, 106 (J. Richards ed.
1978).
119. See P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN 134 (1970) (stating that "a parent cannot le-
gitimately submit a child who is yet a hypothetical nothing to additional hazards for
the sake of the accumulation of knowledge"). See also Kass, Making Babies - The
New Biology and the "Old" Morality, THE PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1972, at 18, 26-30
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mental subject.120 Beyond the conflict between the benefits and the
burdens of genetic engineering lie more specific ethical problems,
namely: access, 121 quality,122 confidentiality,123 decisionmaking con-
trol,124 and selfoconcept.125
1. Access
In a market economy, not all people will have equal access to the
benefits of genetic engineering. 12 6 Even existing genetic technologies
do not reach all portions of the population equally. Women in higher
economic strata, for example, have greater access to amniocentesis.127
The more affluent will continue to be in a better position to purchase
genetic services for their offspring. As a result, their children will be
genetically better equipped to prevail than were their parents.128
Limited access to genetic engineering will exacerbate the distance be-
(manipulation of embryos during artifical insemination and genetic screening poses se-
rious moral issues as to effects of manipulations on the normalcy of the child to be
produced and the parent's entitlement to manipulate).
120. "[W]hen measured by the principles of sound ethics or by the canons of medi-
cal ethics, germinal engineering would be an immoral experiment on the child-to-be -
immoral because it is not consented to by the primary subject; immoral because, when
he is not yet, the child suffers no defect which could justify anyone to give such con-
sent on his behalf, or justify a physician in making the risk-filled balancing judgment."
Ramsey, Genetic Engineering, in HUMAN GENETICS 233, 235 (1975) [hereinafter HUMAN
GENETICS]. For a survey of concerns that arise with embryo research, see Robertson,
Embryo Research, 24 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 15 (1986).
121. See infra notes 126-170 and accompanying text.
122. There are at least two quality issues affecting biomedical ethics. First, there
are not enough genetic counselors to handle the needs created by multiplying technol-
ogies. Andrews, supra note 108, at 623. See also Wilfond & Fost, The Cystic Fibrosis
Gene: Medical and Social Implications for Heterozygote Detection, 263 J. A.M.A. 2777,
2780-81 (1990) (screening done annually on 3,000,000 couples contemplating children
would require the 950 certified genetic counselors and clinical geneticists in the United
States to commit more than 17 weeks a year to cystic fibrosis alone). Second, medical
schools do not emphasize genetics. N. HOLTZMAN, PROCEED WITH CAUTION 160-61
(1989).
123. See infra notes 171-92 and accompanying text.
124. Supporters of the use of genetic engineering assert that the patient's decision-
making control is protected under the general doctrine of "informed consent." See
Dyck, Ethics and Medicine, in ETHICS AND MEDICINE 114, 120-21 (S. Reiser, A. Dyck,
W. Curren eds. 1977). Part of this issue is addressed as privacy at infra notes 256-74
and accompanying text.
125. Andrews, supra note 108, at 620-21. Regarding self-concept, see inkfra notes
316-18 and accompanying text.
126. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 67.
127. Andrews, supra note 108, at 622. An estimated 24% of all new mothers annu-
ally receive no prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 1989, 31 (1990).
128. Note, supra note 28, at 462.
tween social classes.129 There are at least two approaches to the dis-
tribution of limited resources: utilitarianism and Rawls' theory of
justice.
a. Utilitarianism
The utilitarian approach addresses issues from the premise that the
rightness and wrongness of an action is determined by the usefulness
of its consequences.i3 0 Utilitarianism suggests that genetic technol-
ogy should be applied to optimize total goods and satisfaction.' 3 ' This
may be achieved either by minimizing suffering and unhappiness, or
by maximizing pleasure and happiness.'3 2 The actual distribution
system could be directed either to those who are least genetically
well-off, so as to minimize suffering, or to those who are already
well-off so as to increase happiness. 3 3 Whether the benefits are dis-
tributed to the genetically deprived or the genetically fit is not im-
portant to the utilitarian, so long as the optimum good is achieved.134
Because the deprived and the fit will likely have unequal numbers
in the population, the problem may also raise issues of minority
rights. Whatever distribution scheme is adopted, if the benefits of ge-
netic engineering are provided to a majority at the expense of a mi-
nority (a distinct possibility since the goal is merely the greatest total
benefit), profound injustice may result.35 It is, indeed, this lack of a
theory of justice for which critics often reprove utilitarianism.136
Philosopher John Rawlsi3 7 attempts to alleviate this deficiency.
b. Rawls' Theory of Justice
(1). The Difference Principle
Rawls objects to the utilitarian approach because it contemplates
only the greatest net total of satisfaction 38 without considering the
129. See Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in Distributive Justice and Utility
Posed by the New Biology, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 318, 325 (1974). It may be argued that
any disparity in the population as to access to genetic engineering will result in an un-
dermining of the first amendment since the amendment is based on the premise that
all must have freedom to speak so that the will of the majority may be ascertained.
See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-48 (1960).
130. See Taylor, Utilitarianism, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 19 (T. Mappis & J. Zembaty
eds. 1981).




135. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and Bioethics, in LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE
131, 140 (1984).
136. See id. at 138.
137. Rawls is a professor of philosophy at Harvard University.
138. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24 (1971).
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manner in which the sum of satisfactions is distributed.39 Rawls
notes that, in every society, people have different natural assets and
are born into different social strata.1 40 Although each of these condi-
tions is undeserved, they have a profound effect on a person's life.14l
Because these inequalities of birth and natural assets are undeserved,
Rawls asserts they require compensation.142 Such compensation,
however, does not necessarily mean equality for all.i43 Rawls pro-
poses instead a theory of justice that capitalizes on the inherent dif-
ferences in individuals and utilizes them to the benefit of all.' 4 a This
is Rawls' "difference principle."145
Rawls arrives at the difference principle by considering how justice
might be drawn from a hypothetical "original position.' 46 A person
in the original position operates behind a "veil of ignorance" that pre-
vents her from knowing any information about herself such as social
status, physical or mental capabilities, or even her belief system. 47
Only from such a position of universal equality can principles of jus-
tice be drawn.148 In establishing how to distribute social primary
goods, for example, "rights and liberties, powers and opportunities,
income and wealth" and self-respect, 49 Rawls determines that a per-
son operating from the original position would develop two princi-
ples. First, liberties ascribed to each individual should be as
extensive as possible without infringing upon the liberties of
others.150 Second, social primary goods should be distributed to the
greatest advantage of everyone and by mechanisms that allow equal
opportunity to all.151
Of course, in reality there will be differences in the natural assets
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 100.
143. J. RAWLs, supra note 138, at 101.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 136.
147. Id. at 136-37.
148. J. RAWLS, supra note 138, at 140.
149. Id. at 62.
150. Id. at 60-61. The liberties to be ascribed are: the right to vote, eligibility for
political office, "freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure." Id. at 61.
151. Id. at 60-61. Social and economic inequalities must be distributed "to every-
one's advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and offices of command
must be accessible to all." Id. at 61.
and social strata of individuals.152 Such differences are acceptable,
however, if under the second principle, they are distributed to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged.53 Rejecting strict egalitari-
anism,15 4 Rawls asserts this does not mean it is necessary to take
these social primary goods from the advantaged and redistribute
them to the disadvantaged.55 Such a system, he claims, would lower
the expectations of the advantaged, reducing their abilities to provide
for the benefit of all.156 This would result in less social primary
goods than if the advantaged were allowed the benefits of their
advantages.157
For example, if the advantaged are allowed the freedom to utilize
their greater abilities they will use capital to provide jobs for the
disadvantaged.
[T]he greater expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do
things which raise the long term prospects of laboring class. Their better
prospects act as incentives so that the economic process is more efficient, inno-
vation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on. Eventually the resulting material
benefits spread throughout the system to the least advantaged. 15 8
Thus, the difference principle does not attempt to eliminate ine-
qualities, rather it operates to minimize inequalities by increments. 5 9
No social primary good may be afforded an already advantaged indi-
vidual unless it has the effect of raising the expectations of the disad-
vantaged.160 Rawlsian society seeks the highest possible social
minimum wherein the more advantaged utilize their greater goods in
a scheme designed to benefit the least advantaged persons. 16 1
Rawls' theory of justice also addresses opportunity.162 There
should be absolute equality without consideration for the expecta-
tions of the advantaged.163 Opportunities such as education should be
allocated according to both the principle of maximizing productivity
in training and the principle of "enriching the personal and social
life of citizens, including here the less favored."'164 Rawls also identi-
fies "excellences" such as "imagination and wit, beauty and grace,
and other natural assets and abilities" that benefit society.165 Using
152. Id. at 78.
153. J. RAWLS, supra note 138, at 73.
154. Id. at 538-39.
155. Id. at 102.
156. Id. at 78-80.
157. Id. In economic terms, this may be what is sometimes pejoratively referred to
as the "trickle down" theory.
158. J. RAWLS, supra note 138, at 78.
159. Id. at 79.
160. Id. at 95.
161. Id. at 105.
162. Id. at 73.
163. J. RAWLS, supra note 138, at 73.
164. Id. at 107.
165. Id. at 443.
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these concepts, it is possible to address the problem of access to ge-
netic engineering.
(2). Applying Rawls to Genetic Engineering
Under Rawls' theory of justice, genetic engineering is seen as a tool
to increase economic wealth by providing society with greater ability
to create social primary goods. There would also be an increase in
the "excellences." Access to genetic engineering, however, implicates
both the principle of greatest benefit to the least advantaged as well
as equal opportunity. Indeed, genetic engineering may alter the as-
sumption that there will be differences in people's natural assets.
Genetic engineering should not be permitted merely for the en-
hancement of physical attractiveness because that would not benefit
the least advantaged.166 Arguably, resources should be concentrated
on genetic therapy to address disease and genetic defects.67 How-
ever, such a result is not required under Rawls' theory. Genetic en-
hancement of those already intellectually gifted, for example, might
result in even greater benefit to the least advantaged as a result of
the gifted individual's improved productivity.168 Moreover, Rawls as-
serts that using genetic engineering to prevent the most serious ge-
netic defects is a matter of intergenerational justice.169 Such actions
are necessary in terms of what the present generation owes to later
generations.170
These are just two approaches to the problem of equal access to ge-
netic engineering. Unless genetic engineering is universally available
at the time it is fully developed, there is great potential for injustice
in its distribution.
2. Confidentiality
A second issue of biomedical ethics, particularly as it concerns ge-
netic screening, is confidentiality. There is significant potential for
third parties to misuse a specific individual's genetic information.
Such third parties include employers, insurance companies, and the
state.171 On one hand, it may be relatively simple for a physician to
maintain confidentiality regarding an individual's genetic profile. Ef-
166. Note, supra note 28, at 464.
167. Id. at 464-65.
168. Id. at 465.
169. J. RAWLS, supra note 138, at 108.
170. Id.
171. See Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 109, at 753; Foreman, Working Out the Gen-
forts to reduce the cost of genetic disorders may, however, over-
whelm individual efforts to maintain privacy. 172
Life and health insurance provide an example. Such insurance is
theoretically a mechanism for spreading risk among a large popula-
tion; however, precise genetic screening may destroy this concept.173
The ability to accurately predict disease and premature death may
also put tremendous pressure on the individual's ability to keep her
genetic profile confidential. Changes in the insurance industry itself
have exacerbated these difficulties.
During the 1950s, insurance rates were based on "community rat-
ings," i.e., the health costs of an entire community were used to cal-
culate insurance premiums for individuals and groups without regard
for the health of any particular individual.174 Competition among in-
surance companies for increased volume and profits, however, caused
them to identify smaller groups with better than average loss histo-
ries.175 Companies began offering bargain rates based on occupation
groups.176 Reduced rates have also been based on habits such as non-
smoking and safe driving.177 In contrast, rates became higher for
high-risk occupations as well as for employee groups who exper-
ienced high loss rates.
Genetic testing may allow insurance companies to carry this trend
to its logical conclusion: an insurance premium based upon an indi-
vidual's genetic profile.17 8 By identifying persons whose genes show
a disposition toward developing high cost diseases, companies can
protect themselves by offering insurance at rates designed to cover
those costs. 179 At the same time, lower rates may be offered to those
who show fewer genetic abnormalities.
Insurance eligibility based on passing a physical examination is
ome Project Ethics - In Advance Medical Ethics, Boston Globe, Feb. 4, 1991, Science &
Tech., at 25.
172. Id. See also Andrews, supra note 108, at 625; School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (discrimination in hiring of individual with tuberculosis).
173. Thiel, Brave New Medicine, GEORGIA TREND, Dec. 1990, at 44 (individuals with
access to their own genetic makeup "will either load up on insurance if they are likely
to die early, or go without coverage if their genetic composition is extraordinarily
good").
174. Gladwell, Health Insurers Grapple with 'Fairness': Linking Premiums to
Risks Puts Heavy Burden on Some Employers, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Z. HARSANYI & R. HUTrON, GENETIC PROPHECY: BEYOND THE DOUBLE HELIX
257 (1981).
178. Saltus, Bias Issue Looms Over Insurers Creating Another Underclass?, Boston
Globe, Nov. 12, 1990, Health/Science, at 33, col. 3, 34, col. 2 (stating that "With gene
testing... insurers could have more powerful tools to pinpoint high-risk individuals,
as well as those likely to remain healthy.").
179. Id.
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quite common. 8 0 Such examinations have become increasingly ex-
tensive with developing medical technology.S1 Having accepted the
notion that a company may offer coverage based on an individual's
preexisting health, it is a very small step to require that there be evi-
dence of limited genetic susceptibility to disease.' 8 2 The issue is two-
fold: first, whether a company may offer or deny coverage based on a
required genetic profile' 8 3 and second, whether the individual may
procure such information privately and submit it to a company to ob-
tain less expensive coverage.
The answer to the first question has yet to be determined, but the
trend toward basing coverage on preexisting conditions remains. 8 4
The second issue of the individual's private screening goes beyond
whether a physician will keep an individual's profile confidential or
even whether such screening is mandatory or voluntary. The issue is
how the individual may use a truly definitive genetic profile. If in-
surance companies are authorized to offer policies based on genetic
probabilities, it leaves the individual who wishes to keep her genetic
profile confidential in a difficult position. Either she reveals the re-
sults of her genetic profile or she pays the higher life and health in-
surance premiums required of those who will either not submit to
such tests or not reveal their results. At no point in this process is
there a need for an involuntary genetic test or a breach of confidence.
The linkage between the consumer and the company is purely eco-
nomic; the forces operating are free enterprise and freedom of
contract.
180. Gladwell, supra note 174, at A10, col. 1.
181. In 1988, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a report indicating "75
percent of insurers for small companies (under 25 employees) and more than 50 per-
cent of commercial insurers of large groups were either screening or planning to
screen applicants for medical problems that might push up health care bills - cardio-
vascular diseases, liver and kidney conditions and diabetes." Gladwell, supra note 174,
at A10, col. 1. In many states insurers test for HIV infection. i Although this is not
genetic screening, it indicates a trend towards genetic testing in determining insurance
premiums and even the availability of coverage.
182. Donald B. White, a spokesman for the Health Insurance Association of
America in Washington has stated that genetic information should not be used to deny
persons insurance but only to set rates for persons without existing medical conditions.
Blakeslee, Ethicists See Omens of an Era of Genetic Bias, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at
B9, col. 5. But see Saltus, supra note 178, at 33 (family denied employer-provided
group health insurance because two members carried defective gene).
183. Reports of insurance being denied based on genetic profiles are beginning to
surface. One result is that those at risk may avoid testing in order to avoid losing in-
surance coverage, even though early treatment might alleviate effects of the disease.
Blakeslee, supra note 182, at B9, col. 3.
184. See id.
The eugenic effect of such insurance is similar to what is some-
times describea as "social Darwinism" in other areas of the free mar-
ket system. But the effect of such insurance becomes more profound
as genetic knowledge increases. While limiting insurance availability
may not be an actively eugenic program, it may affect the individual's
ability to reproduce or the ability to live to an age at which one may
reproduce, or even the individual's decisions regarding reproduction.
An insurance company could require a couple's genetic profiles to
determine coverage of both the couple and their children even before
the children are born. Such a profile could be required of a fetus to
determine whether it will be covered after birth. Knowledge of such
a profile, and the availability of insurance, could easily affect the par-
ents' decision regarding carrying the pregnancy to term. 8 5 Inherent
in these issues is a passive eugenics that, while not requiring the ac-
tual genetic manipulation of an individual, may result in selective
breeding based on the economics of insurance actuarial tables.
Similar issues arise in employment. 8 6 First, while discrimination
laws may prevent an employer from basing its hiring decisions on ge-
netic profiles (an issue yet to be determined), it may very well be to
the advantage of a prospective employee, who can show contraindica-
tions of genetically-related disease, to include that information in a
resume. Such information would be useful to forecast not only the
potential number of workdays that may be missed due to illness, but
it may also help determine an employee's resistance to specific work-
place health hazards.187 Genetically sound persons would be attrac-
tive to employers desiring to minimize the costs of employment.
Second, and another link to insurance, genetic profiles might help
an employer reduce the costs of its health insurance plan. Although
the employer may not be able to base hiring decisions solely on such
information, an applicant who voluntarily provides evidence of a
185. Observers have recently noted instances where insurers issue policies with
coverage designed to influence couples to have abortions where birth defects in the off-
spring are probable. Saltus, supra note 178, at 34, col. 3.
186. Dr. Paul Billings, a medical ethicist at Pacific Presbyterian Medical Center in
San Francisco has said, "If employers can identify prospective workers who are not
currently disabled but who may later develop illnesses, they can save themselves antic-
ipated health insurance and other costs by refusing employment to the worker."
Blakeslee, supra note 182, at B9, col. 4. Timothy Gailey, a Massachusetts Insurance
Commissioner, has also noted that insurers and employers are beginning to screen out
high-risk individuals by requiring physical examinations prior to employment. Saltus,
supra note 178, at 34, col. 4. Until it was challenged by the American Civil Liberties
Union, the city of Athens, Georgia, based hiring decisions in part on an applicant's cho-
lesterol level. Theil, supra note 173, at 44.
187. Henig, supra note 95, at Z14 (remarking that "Employers ... may selectively
hire only those people whose genes indicate they are resistant to health hazards of the
workplace, which is a cheaper alternative than cleaning up the workplace to make it
safe for everyone.").
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healthy genetic background could certainly have an advantage over
other applicants.
Because of the potential for third parties to misuse genetic infor-
mation, some commentators argue that such information should be
protected by law. 8 8 It may also be necessary to legislate against ge-
netic discrimination.189 While it may be argued that screening should
be voluntary,190 the fear is that societal problems such as over-popu-
lation, the increasing costs of the nation's general welfare program,
and the expense of providing for the elderly and the handicapped,
will favor a trend toward a mandatory genetic screening.191
It should also be noted that the ability to accurately predict the
likelihood of disease and premature death through genetic screening
may destroy the private insurance industry.192 By requiring genetic
testing prior to entering into an insurance contract, insurance compa-
nies can become more conservative in their coverage practices. At its
logical conclusion, risks are no longer spread; both parties to the in-
surance contract will know the probabilities of both death and dis-
ease. If any risk is to be spread it will have to be done by an
organization willing to ignore genetic profiles, namely, the govern-
ment in the form of a national health insurance program.
188. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 108, at 625 (citing Fletcher, Where in the World
are We Going with the New Genetics?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33, 40
(1989)). George Annas, professor of health law at Boston University, has stated: "What
people are worried about is that insurers are going to create a new underclass of medi-
cally uninsurable people, based not only on diseases they now have but the probability
that they will develop an expensive disease in the future." Saltus, supra note 178, at
33, col. 3.
189. Capron, Genetics and the Law: Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat"
of Modern Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 665, 693 (1990).
190. See, e.g., Kessler, The Counselor - Counselee Relationship, in GENETIC COUN-
SELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 53, 60 (S. Kessler ed. 1979).
191. Frankel, The Specter of Eugenics, 57 COMMENTARY 25, 29 (1974). Critics of ge-
netic screening cite the pervasive testing for sickle cell anemia during the 1970s as an
example of a rash application of genetic technology. Elsas, supra note 42, at 828. Five
percent of those tested were designated heterozygous carriers of the defective gene.
Id. Many "asymptomatic adults were stigmatized" by insurance carriers and employ-
ers. Id. Those screened received inadequate counseling concerning reproductive
choices and the potential for passing the genes on to their children. Id. The "prema-
ture" testing program for sickle cell anemia often dissuaded affected couples from rais-
ing families, although such drastic measures were clearly unwarranted. Id.
192. See Saltus, supra note 178 at 34, col. 2 (asserting that genetic screening takes
the "gamble" away from providing coverage and will "requireO redefining the insur-
ance system.").
B. Moral and Religious Arguments
1. Duty to Rescue
Moral arguments favoring the use of genetic engineering often fo-
cus on the issue of whether there is a duty to rescue when a child is
in need of medical attention before birth.193 Three facts make this
question relevant: 1) the growing number of diseases for which ge-
netic components are being discovered,194 2) the fact that these de-
fects can be predicted with increasing accuracy even before
conception, 195 and 3) the fact that these defects can be discovered in
the fetus at progressively early stages.'96 Such screening may even
be mandatory in some circumstances.197 There is also an issue of
whether a duty to treat arises when genetic defects are found.198 One
state has gone so far as to take protective custody of an endangered
fetus by placing the pregnant mother in custody.199 Such action im-
plicates a duty to rescue.
The law, however, recognizes a duty to rescue in only limited cir-
cumstances.200 One such situation exists where there is a special re-
lationship between the person in danger and the person in a position
to rescue,201 such as the relationship between parent and child.202
Because of this relationship, the state may intervene when a parent
makes a medical decision which is not in the best interest of the
child.203 Relying on these arguments, supporters of genetic engineer-
ing assert that parents are morally bound to rescue their children
193. See generally Friedman, Signiicance of Genetic Diseases, in GENETIC SCREEN-
ING AND COUNSELING - A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 5-13 (S. Applewhite, D.
Busbee & D. Borgaonkar eds. 1981) [hereinafter GENETIC SCREENING].
194. Borgaonkar, Clinical Cytogenetics and Counseling of Individuals with
Chromosonal Disorders, in GENETIC SCREENING, supra note 193, at 96.
195. Id.
196. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 14.
197. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813-14, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-02 (1978) (doctor liable for parents' pecuniary loss in failing to inform
them of the high-risk of retardation and of the availability of tests to ascertain if their
child would be born with Down's syndrome).
198. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (up to one year impris-
onment and $2000 fine for failing to provide for a fetus's medical needs).
199. Dougherty, The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal Patients
and Corflicts with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (1985) (citing Soloff,
Civil Committment and the Rights of the Unborn, 136 AM. J. Psy. 114 (1979)). But see
In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 29-31, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528-29 (1981) (overturn-
ing juvenile court's order incarcerating pregnant woman because the fetus was not cov-
ered by child-neglect laws).
200. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 12-13.
201. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.
REV. 217, 219 (1908).
202. See 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 11 (1978).
203. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979)
(parental refusal to consent to medical treatment for child results in state challenge),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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from genetic defects and may even be morally bound to help their
children make the most of their potential. 20 4
Weighing against the duty to rescue is the consequentialist argu-
ment that the "end result" of a genetic rescue is different from that
of other rescues because it is an attack on the source of the defect,
and the rescue affects those other than the child rescued, namely the
child's progeny.2 05 The concern is that by eliminating certain genes
through genetic engineering we may be reducing the species' capacity
to adapt to a changing environment. 2o 6
Weighing against this argument, however, is the possibility that the
genetic structure of future generations may be improved. Also,
should an undesirable strain result, it will still be possible to alter
genes in the future. 20 7 In fact, genetic engineering may increase the
diversity of the human gene pool.20 8 The issue is whether "nature's
'plan' is any better than human ingenuity." 20 9 Proponents of genetic
engineering argue it may be more reasonable to "plan for the future
even with imperfect information, than sit idly by waiting for the ge-
netic roulette wheel to stop spinning."21 0
.2. The Sanctity of Procreation
a. Arguments Against Genetic Engineering
Among the most fervent opponents to genetic engineering and its
eugenic implications are Christian theologians,211 particularly Roman
204. See generally Rosenkranz, supra note 3.
205. Id. at 21. The consequentialist view against genetic rescue can be compared
with deontological arguments which "object to genetic engineering as a means, even if
the ends are identical to... more traditional modes of treatment." Id, See infra notes
212-221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deontological arguments es-
poused by the Roman Catholic Church.
206. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 23.
207. Id.
208. Id (stating that "While some characteristics that we now consider 'defects' will
certainly disappear from the gene pool, genetic engineering is likely to introduce other
characteristics that are not currently in our gene pool.").
209. Id. at 24.
210. Id
211. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 3 n.4. Among the more moderate is Richard A.
McCormick, Notre Dame professor of Christian Ethics. See R. MCCORMICK, HOW
BRAVE A NEW WORLD? 282 n.5 (1981). Not all writers who object to human genetic
engineering are Catholic. Paul Ramsey, professor of religion at Princeton University,
is a Methodist. In a letter to the President of the United States concerning genetic
engineering, two other noncatholic religious leaders admonished "[t]hose who would
play God." Letter from Dr. Claire Randall, General Secretary of the National Council
of Churches, Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum, General Secretary of the Synagogue Coun-
cil of America, and Bishop Thomas Kelly, General Secretary of the United States
Catholics. Generally, their argument is that technology should not
be employed to go beyond the limits intended by God.212 In particu-
lar, these thinkers focus on the sanctity of marriage, lovemaking, and
the purpose of sex in procreation. 213 Creating or manipulating life
outside the marital relationship "violate[s] the reverence due to
human life in its generation"214 by subordinating procreation to its
producers.215 Genetic engineering reduces the status of human be-
ings from that of God's greatest creation to that of an object.216 Such
activity is beneath human dignity.2 1 7 Genetic engineering for any
purpose, even therapeutic,2 18 will inevitably undermine marriage,2 19
parenthood,220 family,22 1 and eventually life itself.
Catholic Conference to President Jimmy Carter (June 20, 1980), reprinted in SPLICING
LIFE, supra note 1, at 95-96.
212. Moraczewski, Dominion, Bioethics and Pluralism, in THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
OF BIRTH AND DEATH 6-7 (1980) [hereinafter THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES].
213. See.May, Reverencing Human Life in Its Generation, in THE NEW TECHNOLO-
GIES, supra note 212, at 61-63.
214. Id. at 64.
215. Id. at 64-65. Not all moral and religious thinkers are absolutists in these argu-
ments. Some assert that artificial insemination from the husband and in vitro fertili-
zation are permissible where a married couple cannot otherwise biologically have
children and where the risk of genetic mishaps is no more than the risks involved in
the "natural process." See, e.g., C. CURRAN, POLITICS, MEDICINE, AND CHRISTIAN ETH-
ics 215-19 (1973).
216. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 649 (1973) (asserting that "But does not
that dream [of designing every detail] at least potentially entail the final transforma-
tion of man into an object - a thing to be 'engineered.' ").
217. [G]enetic manipulation of human embryos ... [is] contrary to the human
dignity proper to the embryo, and at the same time [it is] contrary to the right
of every person to be conceived and to be born within marriage and from mar-
riage.... Certain attempts to influence chromosomic or genetic inheritance
are not theraputic but are aimed at producing human beings selected accord-
ing to ... predetermined qualities. These manipulations are contrary to the
personal dignity of the human being and his or her integrity and identity....
Every person must be respected for himself; in this consists the dignity and
right of every human being from his or her beginning.
The Vatican on Birth Science, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A14, col. 4.
218. The Catholic condemnation of genetic engineering is not universal. There has
been papal approval of somatic genetic engineering "when its aim is to ameliorate the
conditions of those who are affected by chromosonic [sic] diseases because this offers
hope for the great number of people affected by those maladies." J. AREEN, supra
note 6, at 175 (quoting Pope John Paul II, La Sperimentozione in Biologia Deve Con-
tribuire al Bene Integrale Dell 'Uomo, L'Osservatore Romano, Oct. 24, 1982, at 2). Pro-
ponents of wider use of genetic engineering argue that it is not clear why such
techniques are impermissible before the child is born but are permissible after, partic-
ularly considering the Vatican's contention that a fetus is a person no different than
those who are born. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 36.
219. May, supra note 213, at 65 (asserting that "[A]ny act of generating human life
... non-marital[ly] . . . is in essence a destruction of marriage itself.").
220. P. RAMSEY, supra note 119, at 135. "[T]o be debiologized and recombined in
various ways, parenthood must first be broken or removed. When the transmission of
life has been debiologized, human parenthood as a created covenant of life is placed
under massive assault and men and women will no longer be who they are." Id.
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b. Arguments Favoring Genetic Engineering
Weighed against these arguments is the contention that many
other aspects of childrearing, apart from procreation, can be charac-
terized as artistic production, for example, selection of education,
religious instruction, and personality development. 222 Rather than
destroying the value of family, proponents argue genetic engineering
would be based in "the tender and watchful care that naturally
springs from affection."223 By giving parents the responsibility to de-
sign the characteristics of their child, especially where the parents
are responsible for ensuring that their child's potential is attained,
would increase the value of parenting.224
3. Moral Relativism
A third moral/religious argument is that genetic engineering inher-
ently involves judgments as to the relative value of different lives -
a judgment which critics maintain is immoral in itself.225 The goal of
eliminating genetic "defects" is in tension with efforts to accept "de-
fective" individuals.226 Paul Ramsey, religion professor at Princeton
University, reflecting on the progressively harmful consequences of
genetic knowledge, states:
Before us then opens up the dizzy, abysmal prospect that man can be present
where the foundations of the world were laid. Piece by piece of information
may destroy our sense, that for all the genetic corruption, God made the
world and the human creature and they are good. We may finally lose our
faith that, under God, life should always be affirmed with joy and hope be-
yond despair - and lose also our concern that even genetically defective lives
be saved and cared for.2 2 7
There is also a fear that society's search for genetic perfection will
serve to ostracize other less fortunate members of society such as the
mentally retarded, the infirm, the disabled, or the elderly.228
221. R. MCCORMICK, supra note 211, at 304. "The family.., embodies the ordinary
conditions wherein we... learn to become persons." Id.
222. See Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 36.
223. Id at 52 (quoting H. SIDGWICK, THE METHOD OF ETHICS 249 (7th ed. 1907)).
224. Id.
225. Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 21.
226. Callahan, The Meaning and Significance of Genetic Disease: Philosophical
Perspectives, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 583-84 (T. Beauchanp & L. Wal-
ters eds. 1978).
227. Ramsey, Genetic Therapy, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN
157, 175 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972).
228. See Jacobs, A Religious Response to Tay-Sachs Disease Screening and Preven-
tion, in TAY-SACHS DISEASE: SCREENING AND PREVENTION 75, 77 (M. Kaback, D.
Rimoin & J. O'Brien eds. 1977).
C. Legal Arguments
1. Regulating Research
Even if one accepts one or more of the arguments against the use
of genetic engineering, actual attempts at limiting its use, including
potential eugenic uses, will be difficult. Past efforts at regulating ge-
netic engineering research229 have found it all but impossible to dis-
tinguish between processes that have eugenic potential and other
projects of great benefit such as cancer research. 230 Also, genetic re-
search already has considerable momentum, driven in no small mea-
sure by the fact that it is so profitable. The United States
Department of Commerce estimates, for example, that the worldwide
market for genetically engineered drugs alone will reach $100 billion
per year by the end of this decade. 231 Also genetic research is al-
ready being done in a worldwide community in which new informa-
tion is exchanged freely and where new advances are achieved at
relatively small cost. If research is limited in one country or even a
group of countries, new developments will be made even more profit-
able to those researchers who defy the ban.
Interest in regulating fetal research began in the United States in
1973 with the Supreme Court's decision of Roe v. Wade.232 As a re-
sult, the National Research Act of 1974233 and the National Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research were created.234 The Commission developed
229. Some state laws prohibit using certain genetic technologies. For example,
seven states prohibit experimental gene therapy on embryos. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:122 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685 -.2692 (West
1980); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1
(Supp. 1990); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1990).
There are, of course, those who maintain that the fear that current research will
someday lead to genetically-programmed humans "is far too insubstantial to justify
stopping or not investing in gene therapies, which, if effective, have such a great poten-
tial for eliminating disease and suffering." Robertson, Genetic Alteration, supra note
50, at 117.
230. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1339-40.
231. Osterlund, Challenges to US Lead in Biotech, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 24,
1985, at 14, col. 3. There is also great profit potential in genetic screening. Regarding
the marketing of a test for cystic fibrosis, Dr. Norman Fost, a geneticist and pediatri-
cian at University of Wisconsin Medical School, noted, "This is the gold rush.... This
is the Klondike.... The potential market for this screening is at a minimum a billion-
dollar a year industry." Kolata, Rush Is On to Capitalize on Testing for Gene Causing
Cystic Fibrosis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at C3, col. 2.
232. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional state criminal abortion laws that
except only life-saving procedures without regard to length of pregnancy).
233. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
234. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975). Recent U.S. medical history is not without its ex-
amples of medical experimentation which was detrimental to its human subjects. Be-
tween 1930 and 1970, medications were withheld or harmful agents given to better
understand the natural progress of syphilis (Tuskegee Institute), infectious hepatitis
(Willowbrook State School), and cancer (Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital), without
[Vol. 18: 471, 1991] The New Eugenics
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
regulations and laws allowing fetal research under strict regula-
tion.235 The community of genetic researchers first adopted self-lim-
its on recombinant DNA research236 and later cooperated in imposing
limited federal regulations on their studies.2 37 Since that time, how-
ever, the community has resisted statutory restriction.23 8 In 1982, a
presidential commission recommended the establishment of a
broadly representative board to oversee issues of genetic engineering.
The recommendation was, however, never implemented.
While federal regulation affects some private research, most regu-
lation concerns only federally funded projects. 23 9 Current federal
regulation prohibits funding of any research on the pre-embryo as
well as research that presents "significant" risk to the fetus at any
stage of development. The National Institute of Health (NIH) Re-
combinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) subgroup on Human
Gene Therapy reviews all applications for NIH funding which con-
cern research of recombinant DNA.240 Gene therapy projects are
also reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration and the Depart-
ment of Human and Health Services.241 Before reviewing such
projects, these agencies require prior approval by local review
boards.242 Section III-A-4 of the NIH guidelines requires prior ap-
proval of the RAC for any research involving "[d]eliberate transfer of
recombinant DNA or DNA."243 The RAC has indicated it will not
entertain proposals under section III-A-4 for germ-line244 alterations,
but will consider approving proposals for research involving somatic
gene therapy. 245
the informed consent of the subjects. See Rothman, Were Tuskegee and Willowbrook
'Studies of Nature'?, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1982).
235. Fletcher & Schulman, Fetal Research: The State of the Question, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 6 (1985).
236. Id. at 176.
237. M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD 46 (1977).
238. L. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 76-78 (1987).
239. See generally Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51
Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986). These restrictions are directed at the subjects of the research
rather than the nature. "[A]ny approach to implementing guidelines should not im-
pede future developments in rDNA technology." Id. at 23,308.
240. Elsas, supra note 42, at 830.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 830-31.
243. National Institute of Health Guidelines on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 51
Fed. Reg. 16,960, § III-A-4 (1986).
244. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
245. National Institutes of Health, Points to Consider in the Design and Submis-
sion of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols, 50 Fed. Reg. 33, 463 (Aug. 19,
1985). See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
Since April 1988, there has been an informal moratorium on fetal
research in the United States.2 46 Such a moratorium will likely be
lifted in the near future, except for a number of experimental areas
such as human cloning, recombinant DNA germ-line therapy, the
combining of human and animal genes to create new life forms, the
commercial sale of embryonic tissue and the development of artifi-
cially fertilized human eggs for research.247
Much of the reason for restricting research involving human em-
bryos, fetuses and fetal tissue is the association with voluntary abor-
tion.248 This effect is particularly strong in the United States.249 The
ban in this country includes federal funds for research on the use of
fetal tissue in treating Parkinson's disease, diabetes, epilepsy,
Alzheimer's disease and spinal cord injuries.250 Dr. John C. Wilke,
president of the National Right to Life Committee, in support of the
ban on fetal research, stated, "It is unworthy of us, as a nation, to kill
our unborn children and then use them for spare parts. The govern-
ment should protect unborn babies, not stripmine them."251 Because
experimenting on embryos is necessary to perfect genetic engineering
techniques, this restriction affects genetic experimentation.
Arguing in favor of continued genetic research are those who as-
sert that curbing such research implicates both the first and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution.252 All
scientific research, it is argued, is analogous to the freedom to pub-
lish. Therefore, there must be a "high probability" that the research
will lead to harm before it may be regulated.2 53 Furthermore, the
246. Cimons, Abortion War Snags Research, L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
247. See Dickson, Europe Split on Embryo Research, 242 SCIENCE 1117 (1988) (offi-
cials at the Council of Europe found there was broad agreement in Europe to prohibit
these areas of research).
248. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 109, at 755.
249. "Today, the United States is the only developed nation whose elected leaders,
because of moral opposition to abortion, plan to reduce genetic services." Id. at 758.
250. Cimons, supra note 246, at Al, col. 1.
251. Id. (emphasis in original).
252. "We are dealing with the scientific process as First Amendment 'expression'
plus privacy as an individual liberty formed by the penumbras of specific constitutional
guarantees, and it is difficult to perceive a valid governmental interest which would
sustain attempts to 'contract the spectrum of available knowledge.'" I. CARMEN, CLON-
ING AND THE CONSTITUTION 30 (1985) (emphasis in original). The opposite view has
been expressed:
[D]o we want to assume the basic responsibility for life on this planet - to de-
velop new living forms for our own purposes? Shall we take into our hands
our own future evolution? ... Perverse as it may, initially, seem to the scien-
tist, we must face the fact that there can be unwanted knowledge.
Dixon, Tinkering with Genes, 235 Spectator, Aug. 30, 1975, at 289, col. 3 (quoting Dr.
Robert L. Sinsheimer, then Chair of the Biology Department at the California Insti-
tute of Technology).
253. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1251-52 (1977) ("To ban research, the government would have to
show a huge probability, approaching imminence, that the research would yield knowl-
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government would have difficulty meeting such a test since the re-
sults of research are often unpredictable and the effects are not al-
ways fully understood.254 Finally, there is a middle position taken by
those who argue that there should be broad constitutional protection
for research on genetic engineering but tight regulation on its use
apart from research.255
2. Regulating the Use of Genetic Engineering
a. Arguments Favoring Its Use
(1). Abortion and Parental Rights
The arguments regarding regulating the use of genetic engineering,
like the arguments concerning abortion, focus on privacy. Those who
favor its use argue that individuals should have the freedom to
choose and act free from controlling interferences that prevent
meaningful choice.256 Parents have a constitutional right to privacy
in decisions concerning procreative choice,25 7 contraception 258 and
abortion.259 By analogy, proponents argue that privacy rights should
be extended to decisions regarding the use of genetic engineering. 260
If an infertile couple desires a child, the legislature cannot forbid the
use of a reproductive technology.261
edge that, if available, would very likely lead to substantial harms that the government
may legitimately prevent, that no other means would as effectively reduce the harm,
and that the predicted beneficial uses of the knowledge would be small.").
254. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1340 n.350. But see Furrow, Governing Science:
Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1417 (1983) (even pure
scientific experimentation may be regulated as action rather than speech).
255. See, e.g., I. CARMEN, supra note 252, at 186-90.
256. See id. at 191-92. Dr. James Watson has suggested that laws be passed in order
to protect individual privacy from the scrutinizing demands of employers, insurance
companies and law enforcement officials. Hall, James Watson and the Search for Biol-
ogy's 'Holy Grail,' SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1990, at 48-49.
257. The Supreme Court's recognition of a right to privacy extends to procreative
decisionmaking by the unmarried, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972)
(holding that statute denying contraception to unmarried persons denies constitution-
ally guaranteed equal protection), and perhaps minors, Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (ruling that statute seeking to deny minors information
regarding contraception was unconstitutional).
258. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that state statute forbid-
ding marital use of contraception was unconstitutional violation of privacy rights).
259. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra note 232. But cf Webster v. Re-
productive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3054-58 (1989) (holding constitutional a state
ban on use of public facilities to perform nontheraputic abortions).
260. See I. CARMEN, supra note 252, at 191-92.
261. Robertson, New Reproduction, supra note 21, at 954-62 (advocating recognition
of a right to noncoital reproduction).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of pro-
creation without state interference as "one of the basic civil rights of
man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 262 The Constitution guarantees parents the right to provide
their descendants with a healthy genome.26 3 The right to procreate
or, alternatively, the right to abort, indirectly affords a limited right
to select and control the characteristics of offspring.264 To overcome
this right of privacy, the state would have to show compelling reasons
that could not be based merely on moral or ethical distaste.265 Advo-
cates of privacy rights in the use of genetic engineering argue that
regulating positive genetic engineering may precipitate a collision be-
tween the constitutional values of procreative liberty as well as equal
opportunity.266
Apart from arguments dependent upon the legality of abortion,
supporters of genetic engineering read Supreme Court decisions up-
holding parents' privacy rights in raising children as support for a
right to genetically engineer their children as well. These decisions
include Stanley v. Illinois,267 in which the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged it "has frequently emphasized the importance of
the family,"268 and held that the right to conceive and raise a family
is "essential,"269 a "basic civil right."270 The Court stated, "It is car-
dinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."271 Other decisions give parents considerable control in selecting
their children's school,272 influencing their children's education,273
and choosing their children's religious upbringing.274
Supporters of genetic engineering even use the fear of eugenics to
buttress their case. One of the most active lawyers involved in regu-
lating genetic engineering is University of Southern California law
professor Alexander Capron. He believes that "trying to ban a tech-
262. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
263. Robertson, Genetic Alteration, supra note 50, at 125.
264. Id.
265. Id
266. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1284.
267. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
268. Id. at 651.
269. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391 (1923)).
270. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
271. Id (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
272. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding statute requiring
public school education unconstitutional).
273. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching for-
eign language to elementary students held unconstitutional).
274. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (held that Amish parents did not
have to comply with state compulsory education laws).
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nique that will have some beneficial uses is sure to lead to a new
eugenics, in which someone or some group will decide which diseases
will be treated and which will not."275 These decisions, he believes,
are too sensitive to be taken from individuals and given to govern-
ment. "The lesson of history that the clerics forgot was that eugenics
poses no great danger until it is backed up by the power of the state,
well-meaning or otherwise."276
Finally, it is argued that the right to abortion carries with it an in-
herent right to engage in negative eugenics.277 Further, if negative
eugenics is legal, then to deny the right to engage in positive eugenics
through genetic engineering only encourages the admittedly crude
and Draconian process of eugenics through abortion.2 78 If abortion is
to be legal, then the use of genetic engineering, even for admittedly
eugenic purposes, should be legal.
(2). The Child's Rights
While arguments made from the prospective child's point of view
are usually intended to support limiting genetic engineering, support-
ers of the process have also sought to consider this position. First, it
is held that the needs, values and very nature of future generations
may be so different from our own that it will be impossible to base
today's decisions upon a notion of a future generation's own good.279
Second is the Roe v. Wade argument that the fetus has no cognizable
liberty interest before viability.28 0 If the mother can decide to abort
the child, "it follows a fortiori that she can choose a superior life for
it."281 Such a result, the proponents contend, certainly seems prefer-
able for the child.282 Such circumstances are analogous to "wrongful
life" claims which many jurisdictions deny because of the inability to
identify the harm.28 3
275. Capron, Unsplicing the Gordian Knot: Legal and Ethical Issues in the "New
Genetics," in GENETICS AND THE LAW III 26 (A. Milinsky & G. Annas eds. 1985).
276. Id.
277. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1300.
278. Id.
279. Note, A Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue for Future Genera-
tions, 1 J.L. & TECH. 67, 83-94 (1986).
280. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, does not include the unborn." Id. at 158.
281. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1297.
282. Id.
283. "[T]he infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a
determination." Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967) (a mal-
Furthermore, there are circumstances other than abortion in
which parents have broad rights regarding their children. These in-
clude cases where parents represent their children on other questions
of life and death. In In re Quinlan,284 parents were allowed to decide
whether to continue life support systems for their comatose teenage
daughter.285 Other examples include the Reagan Administration's
unsuccessful efforts to intervene in the "Baby Doe" cases. 28 6 Such
cases argued the supremacy of parental rights over those of the child,
including the right to genetically engineer.28 7 If the parents can
choose life or death for a child, then it is illogical to deny them the
right to decide on genetic engineering for their child.
b. Arguments Opposing the Use of Genetic Engineering
(1). Abortion and Parental Rights
Those opposing the use of genetic engineering make many of the
same arguments that are used against legalized abortion. The right
to privacy, they contend, should not extend to all issues of procrea-
tion.28 8 Opponents note, for example, that courts have not enforced
practice case brought on behalf of a child whose mother was not told of risks of con-
tracting German measles during pregnancy). An examination of the child's rights in a
wrongful life action also contrasts significantly to the rights of the parents in an action
for "wrongful birth." The parents in a wrongful birth action seek recovery for the fail-
ure of their doctor to inform them of their fetus's genetic defects. W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 370 (5th
ed. 1984). Unlike the child's rights in wrongful life claims, the courts have overwhelm-
ingly approved the rights of parents in worngful birth claims. T. Rogers, III, Wrongful
Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal
Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 713-14 (1982).
284. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
285. Id. at 28, 355 A.2d at 664 (holding that the daughter's right of privacy was to be
vindicated by her father as guardian because she was incompetent).
286. In these cases, the federal government attempted to regulate physician-patient
decisions not to treat seriously, genetically disabled newborns. In one case the parents
decided to forego corrective surgery for a child born with tracheoesophageal fistula,
which blocked his digestive tract, and Down's syndrome, a nonlethal, cytogenic cause
of mental retardation. The child subsequently died of complications and starvation.
Comment, "New" Rights for Handicapped Newborns: Baby Doe and Beyond, 22 CAL.
W.L. REV. 127, 132-34 (1985). See also Hoving, The "Baby Doe" Cases, 72 A.B.A. J. 50
(Apr. 1, 1986) (referring to another case where the child was born with multiple de-
fects but lived after the parents refused surgery). President Reagan instructed the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794, applied to handicapped newborns and required the 6,400 hospitals receiv-
ing federal aid not to discriminate against an "otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual solely by reason of his handicap." Discrimination Against the Handicapped by
Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed.
Reg. 26,027 (1982). The HHS rulings were challenged in Bowen v. American Hosp.
Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), which held that: 1) the mandatory sections of the HHS regu-
lations violated state authority; 2) the regulatory actions were unauthorized; and 3)
hospital treatment of minor patients without parental consent is tortious. Id. at 642,
646-47.
287. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1301.
288. See generally Developments in the Law, Medical Technology and the Law, 103
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surrogate-mother arrangements. 28 9 The right to have sex without re-
production, it is pointed out, is distinguishable from the right to have
reproduction in the absence of sex.290 In the latter circumstance, the
rights of the child must be considered as well as the rights of the par-
ents. This was the basis for the results in In re Baby M., where the
best interests of the child prevailed over the surrogacy agreement.291
The same analysis may be applied to genetic engineering, depriving
the parents of their privacy rights in procreation.292
Abortion, opponents argue, which results in the elimination of
more than 1.3 million 293 lives each year, is so destructive that it is not
a reasonable justification for any other activity, much less one that
could change human life itself.294 It should not be forgotten that pro-
creative freedom is limited by Roe v. Wade, which held that the
states may proscribe abortions after the child reaches viability.295
Furthermore, the procreative liberty outlined in Roe may not extend
to decisions beyond whether to bear a child.296 It is a long leap be-
tween the right to bear or abort a child and the right to "create a
master race." 297 The privacy protected in Roe concerns the process of
conceiving, not the process of "fashioning a particular type of
child."298 There is a marked difference between abortion and the
HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1523-24 (1990). "The individualized, ad hoc character of traditional
medical decisionmaking is ill-suited to address the broader ethical issues implicated in
modern medicine." Id.
289. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 451-52, 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (1988) (finding surrogacy
contracts unenforceable, but refusing to address a constitutional right to privacy). See
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding state sodomy law but
suggesting that the Roe v. Wade line of cases does not create a general zone of sexual
privacy which is off limits to government intrusion).
290. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983).
291. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. at 457, 537 A.2d at 1256. For a discussion of the rights
of the unborn child, see supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
292. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, States
library, Tenn. file) (rejecting procreative freedom arguments in a case involving cus-
tody of seven frozen embryos).
293. Cimons, supra note 246, at Al, col. 1.
294. See Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1303. There are other examples of self-inter-
ested individuals acting outside government restraint which have brought about the
extermination of whole biological species, as well as tribal and other minority groups.
See, e.g., A. CROSBY, ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM: THE BIOLOGICAL EXPANSION OF Eu-
ROPE, 900-1900 267-68 (1986).
295. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). See supra notes 232 and 259 and accompanying text.
296. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1287.
297. Id. at 1288.
298. Id. at 1291.
manipulation of genetic structure in that the latter takes place
outside of the mother's body.299 This fact raises the community's in-
terest in protection of the prospective child since such interest does
not impinge on the mother's body.
Apart from the abortion arguments, opponents cite instances
where the state has asserted its own interests in parental decisions,
including child labor laws3 0 0 and laws concerning child abuse and ne-
glect.3 0 ' Opponents assert the general principle that courts may in-
tervene in family decisions where such intervention would serve "the
best interests of the child."302 For example, in Prince v. Massachu-
setts,30 3 the United States Supreme Court held that the state's inter-
est superseded a guardian's free exercise claim that selling religious
literature was part of the child's religious duty.30 4 Significantly,
every jurisdiction in the United States has laws against child abuse
and neglect.305 A substantial percentage of the 150,000 to 200,000
yearly court actions in child abuse cases30 6 result in separating the
child from the home.30 7 Moreover, many states extend their child
protection laws to fetuses with sanctions that include withdrawal of
parental custody, criminal penalties, and compulsory medical treat-
299. Ozar, The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen Embryos, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 7, 8 (Aug. 1985). But see Comment, Frozen Embryos: The Constitution on
Ice, 19 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 267, 279-81 (1985) (arguing that Roe v. Wade protects the
procreative right to freeze and to destroy frozen embryos).
300. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1301.
301. Id.
302. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD 3-7 (1973) (discussing the best interests test in the context of child
placement). Parents do not have absolute rights over their children where the best in-
terests of a child dictate otherwise. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983) (where Court invalidated municipal ordinance
which provided that an abortion was never in the best interests of the minor, absent
parental consent); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976) (where Court invalidated state statute imposing as a "blanket provision"
the requirement of parental consent in order for an unmarried minor to have an abor-
tion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy).
303. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
304. Id at 170. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves." Id.
305. Note, The Child's Right to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness": Suits
by Children Against Parents for Abuse, Neglect, and Abandonment, 34 RUTGERS L.
REV. 154, 178-79 (1981) (citing NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. (OMDS) 80-3091, DATA ASPECTS OF
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: REPORT FROM THE FOURTH NAT'L CONFERENCE ON DATA
ASPECTS OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 1 (1980)).
306. Comment, Lawyering for the Abused Child: "You Can't Go Iome Again," 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1216, 1217 n.10 (1982).
307. Reynolds & Lacoursiere, Interminable Child Neglect/Custody Cases: Are There
Better Alternatives?, 21 FAM. L.Q. 239, 265 (1982-83).
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ment during pregnancy.308 The interest and power of the courts to
intervene between parents and their children, particularly for the
welfare of the child, should not be underestimated.
(2). The Child's Rights
Opponents of genetic engineering argue that a fetus has rights
which should be upheld.309 Citing a "capacity for moral personal-
ity,"310 the argument is made that life begins at conception and that
all constitutional rights should attend the conceived child.3" The
fact that the child is genetically different from its mother attests to
its separate status.3 12 The issue should not be, it is argued, whether a
particular being can talk or reason, but whether it can suffer.31s In-
deed, the courts have recognized a duty to protect unborn children
from prenatal injuries and have allowed the child to recover if he or
she is born alive.314
Paul Freund and Laurence Tribe, both professors at Harvard Law
School, have separately argued that the unborn have a right to ran-
dom genomes. "The mystery of individual personality, resting on the
chance combination of ancestral traits, is the basis of our sense of
mutual compassion and at the same time, of accountability." 315
308. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 604-05 (1986).
309. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1293.
310. Id. (citing J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 504-10 (1971)).
311. See. e.g., Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1094-95 (1986); Ashley, Pro-Life Evangelization, in THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES OF BIRTH AND DEATH 80, 84-86 (1980); Noonan, Is Abortion a Private Choice,
in THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF BIRTH AND DEATH 98, 102-03 (1980).
312. See King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of
the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1675 (1979) (referring to the fetus as a "second
patient").
313. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 138 (1970). The nervous system of a ten-week-old fetus may respond to local
stimuli. Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1401, 1421 (questioning whether "motor reaction to stimuli amounts to pain and
suffering").
314. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 367-69 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that although not affecting the duty owed,
many jurisdictions premise recovery on viability or quickening of the fetus when the
harm was inflicted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts advocates recovery for injury
that occurs any time after conception. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 com-
ment (1)d (1977). Criminal law and inheritance law also recognize fetal rights. G.
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 94-95 (1985).
315. Freund, Xeroxing Human Beings, in HUMAN GENETICS 233, 242 (T. Mertens
ed. 1975).
[A]s one's most intimate nature as a person - one's genetic basis and neurologi-
cal identity - becomes increasingly subject to deliberate external manipulation
and even prior determination, one's ability to conceive of oneself as a free and
rational being entitled to resist various societal claims may gradually weaken
and might finally disappear altogether. 3 16
Essential human dignity may be compromised by the child's realiza-
tion that she is the product of genetic fabrication.17 "One's sense of
'selfhood' or. 'personhood,' and the related experience of one's auton-
omous individuality, may depend... on the ability to think of oneself
as neither fabricated genetically nor programmed neurologically." 3 18
Finally, there is the argument that no generation has the right to
make decisions for future generations as potentially cataclismic as
that which might be generated through the use of genetic engineer-
ing.319 The consequences go well beyond the fetus whose genes are
engineered.3 20
[Ilf any one age really attains ... the power to make its descendants what it
pleases, all men who live after it are the patients of that power. They are
weaker, not stronger: for though we may have put wonderful machines in
their hands we have pre-ordained how they are to use them. 3 2 1
Genetic engineering enables parents to "shackle" their children to a
life of the parents' choosing. 322 This is a power which is absolute and
it should not be exercised without restraint.
IV. EUGENICS AND ABORTION
Finally, the most hotly disputed social issue in the United States
today is abortion. As indicated above, there is a considerable similar-
ity between the issues of abortion and genetics as applied to eugenics.
Perhaps because both issues concern procreation, they divide opin-
ions sharply. The arguments on both sides of the genetic engineering
issue are compelling, in many ways more compelling than the argu-
ments surrounding abortion. Abortion pits the rights of the mother
against the rights of her child. Eugenic genetic engineering juxta-
poses our ability to be potentially free from disease, perhaps even to
reach the highest levels of human achievement, against the rights of
all future generations to live their lives free from genetic control.
316. Tribe, supra note 216, at 648 (footnote omitted). "[Olur sense of ourselves as
unique, particular beings . .. would be undermined if... we were bred 'to order' ac-
cording to some plan. The random biological hazard of our parents' mating affirms
that we belong to ourselves, for no one planned us." C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 155
(1978).
317. See Tribe, supra note 216, at 648.
318. Id.
319. See Rozenkranz, supra note 3, at 22-23.
320. Id. at 22-24 (raising an ecological objection to genetic engineering).
321. C. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN OR REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF SCHOOL 36
(1947).
322. Attanasio, supra note 31, at 1296.
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Because the issue of eugenic genetic engineering concerns more than
the life and death of mere individuals, rather it concerns the future
of the human race itself, genetics and eugenics will likely eclipse
abortion as a social issue.323
V. CONCLUSION
The forces pushing us almost inexorably toward acceptance of eu-
genic genetic engineering are considerable.324 We can reduce disease.
We can assure our children a life of incomparable health, strength,
intelligence, beauty, and longevity. In the short term we seem to
have accepted most of the presumptions necessary for increased use
of genetic engineering. Insurance companies can give us lower rates.
Employers can reduce their costs. Corporations can make incredible
amounts of money. We have accepted a society with sharp class dis-
tinctions where the rich get richer while homelessness increases.
Moreover, we are pitted in a global economic battle where a country
that is unwilling to do what is necessary to maintain its supremacy
will surely lose its prominence. In the words of the Vatican,
[W]hat makes opposition to the Brave New World so difficult is the seductive
path that leads to it. Every new advance in human genetic engineering is
likely to be heralded as a great stride forward, a boon for humankind. Every-
one [sic] of the breakthroughs in genetic engineering will be of benefit to
someone, under some circumstances, somewhere in society.... [S]tep by step,
advance by advance, we human beings might well choose to trade away the
spontaneity of natural life for the predictability of technological design.3 2 5
The issue may be where to draw the line between genetic therapy,
and eugenics. This is, however, the slippery slope itself. One may
posit that genetic engineering is permissible to relieve suffering. The
problem becomes defining suffering. Physical pain is certainly con-
sidered suffering, but is there a threshold which must be reached
before genetic engineering is permissible? What about other forms of
suffering such as Down's syndrome, emotional instability, lack of ar-
323. [A] wholly new path of evolution... may... mark the end of human life
as we ... knowfl it. It is possible that the nonhuman life which may take our
place will be superior, but I think it most unlikely and certainly not demon-
strable. In either case, we are ourselves human beings; therefore, we have a
proprietary interest in our survival, and our survival as human beings.
Kass, New Beginnings in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 61 (M.
Hamilton ed. 1972) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
324. "Perhaps world conditions have become so complex and resources so valuable
that society now has a compelling interest in restricting reproduction by those who...
perpetuate human suffering by giving birth to genetically defective offspring." Smith,
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tistic skill, athletic incompetence, shortness, or freckles[?]"326
There are those who argue that any attempt to draw such a line is
immoral. "If diabetes, sickle-cell anemia, and cancer are to be cured
by altering the genetic makeup of an individual, why not proceed to
other 'disorders': myopia, color blindness, left-handedness." 327 But
the fact that principled distinctions are difficult to make can be ar-
gued either way: 1) we should abandon genetic research because we
cannot decide where to stop, or 2) we are compelled to design every
genetic trait that might be relevant to any level of "suffering. " 328
The argument always comes back to values, or perhaps, faith.
In the end, parents usually act in the best interests of their chil-
dren. Given the choice, it is also quite likely children would accept
the superiority given them by genetic engineering 329 as quickly as
they would, say, being born to wealthy parents. Perhaps the all-but-
universal repulsion to the eugenic horrors of the Nazis assures us
that the power of genetic engineering will not be abused. There are
still some years to consider the issue, but it must be considered care-
fully. It will likely be the most important issue this generation will
face.
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